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The 15-Stock Diversification
Myth
by
William J. Bernstein
One of the most dangerous
investment chestnuts is the idea that you can
successfully diversify your portfolio with a
relatively small number of stocks, the magic
number usually being about 15. For example, Ben
Graham, in The Intelligent Investor,
suggests that adequate diversification can be
obtained with 10 to 30 names. In a classic piece
in Journal of Finance in 1968,
Evans and Archer found that portfolios with as
few as 10 securities had risk, measured as
standard deviation, virtually identical to that
of the market. Over the decades, the "15-stock
diversification solution" has become enshrined
in various texts and monographs, most famously
in A Random Walk Down Wall Street:
By the time the portfolio
contains close to 20 equal-sized and
well-diversified issues, the total risk
(standard deviation of returns) of the
portfolio is reduced by 70 percent. Further
increase in the number of holdings does not
produce any significant further risk
reduction.
To emphasize the point, Mr.
Malkiel collated data from a paper by Bruno
Solnik, and combined the reduction in risk of
both domestic and international portfolios into
one nifty graph:
In a paper recently accepted for publication
in Journal of Finance Mr. Malkiel
et. al. extend and update the state of our
knowledge regarding portfolio diversification
and market volatility. It’s a wonderful piece,
well-written and quite understandable, and comes
to four fascinating conclusions:
1. The volatility of individual stocks has
risen over the past few decades (the upper
plot represents monthly returns, the lower
plot annualized monthly returns):
2. The correlation among stock returns is
falling (the solid upper line represents
monthly data, the lower line daily data):
3. The effects of #1 and #2 cancel each other
out. Consequently, the overall volatility of
the market has not changed:
4. However, also because of #1 and #2 the
number of stocks necessary to eliminate
nonsystematic risk is rising (the upper curve
represents the more recent period):

This is all profound and
important stuff. And, unfortunately, highly
misleading. To be blunt, if you think that you
can do an adequate job of minimizing portfolio
risk with 15 or 30 stocks, then you are
imperiling your financial future and the future
of those who depend on you. The reason is
simple: There are critically important
dimensions of portfolio risk beyond standard
deviation. The most important is so-called
Terminal Wealth Dispersion (TWD). In other
words, it is quite possible (in fact, as we
shall soon see, quite easy) to put together a
15-stock or 30-stock portfolio with a very low
SD, but whose lousy returns will put you in the
poorhouse.
This issue has not been much
investigated or discussed. One of the pioneers
in this area is Edward O’Neal of Auburn, who in
a piece in Financial Analysts Journal
a few years back looked at TWD as a function
of the number of mutual funds. His data show
that the risk of TWD falls off as 1/sqrt(n); in
other words, a portfolio of four mutual funds is
half as risky as one. However, I’m not aware of
any definitive studies of TWD as a function of
the number of stocks.
In order to investigate this
problem, I looked at the stocks constituting the
S&P 500 as of 11/30/99, and formed 98 random
equally-weighted 15-stock portfolios for the
12/89-11/99 10-year holding period. Below is a
histogram of the annualized portfolio returns:
The "market return" (all 500
stocks held in equal proportion) was 24.15%.
This is considerably higher than the 18.94%
return of the actual S&P for two reasons: First,
the S&P is a cap-weighted, not an
equal-weighted, portfolio. Second, and much more
important, many of the stocks in the S&P on
11/30/99 were not in the index at the beginning
of the period. The recently-added stocks
obviously had much higher returns than the
companies they replaced, upwardly biasing the
entire series of returns. Nonetheless, these
flaws in the methodology do not change the basic
conclusion; the TWD of these 15-stock portfolios
is staggering—three-quarters of them failed to
beat "the market." (Had the study been done with
the S&P stocks extant on 12/1/99, it seems
certain that the positive kurtoskewness of the
present sample would have been replaced with a
significant negative kurtoskewness—a much more
important descriptor of risk. If anybody wants
to give me a survivorship-bias-free S&P database
for the past 10 years, my modem and mailbox are
in fine working order.) Even so, the scatter of
returns was quite high, with more than a few
portfolios underperforming "the market" by
5%-10% per annum.
The reason is simple: a
grossly disproportionate fraction of the total
return came from a very few "superstocks" like
Dell Computer, which increased in value over 550
times. If you didn’t have one of the half-dozen
or so of these in your portfolio, then you badly
lagged the market. (The odds of owing one of the
10 superstocks are approximately one in six.) Of
course, by owning only 15 stocks you also
increase your chances of becoming fabulously
rich. But unfortunately, in investing, it is all
too often true that the same things that
maximize your chances of getting rich also
maximize your chances of getting poor.
If the O’Neal data are generalizable to
stocks, and I believe that they are, then even
100 stocks are not nearly enough to eliminate
this very important source of financial risk.
So, yes, Virginia, you can eliminate
nonsytematic portfolio risk, as defined by
Modern Portfolio Theory, with a relatively few
stocks. It’s just that nonsystematic risk is
only a small part of the puzzle. Fifteen stocks
is not enough. Thirty is not enough. Even 200 is
not enough. The only way to truly minimize
the risks of stock ownership is by owning the
whole market.
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